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TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY PROPERTY AND THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
BENJAMIN C. ACKERLY*
This Article addresses the impact of the Bankruptcy Code of
19781 on debtors' and creditors' interests in realty held as tenants
by the entirety 2 The 1978 Code constitutes the first major revision
of the bankruptcy laws in over forty years and in many respects
represents a substantial modernization of the bankruptcy process.
When Congress began considering an overhaul of the bankruptcy
law one commentator' suggested that the opportunity was ripe to
cure what was perceived to be the arbitrary and unfair treatment
of entirety property under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898." Although
many of the old problems may have been solved under the new
Code, a number of new, more serious problems have been created.
This Article will consider the joint creditor's ability to enforce his
lien against entirety property when only one spouse is in bank-
ruptcy under both the old and new bankruptcy statutes. Particular
attention will be devoted to the new bankruptcy exemption scheme
and the inequity this scheme creates for creditors in those states
that exempt entirety property from process of creditors of an indi-
vidual debtor. From the view of the joint creditor, the cure, in fact,
* B.A., LL.B., University of Virginia. Partner, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-151326 (West Supp. 1979). The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). For purposes
of brevity, the Bankruptcy Code will be referred to as either the Code or the 1978 Code.
2. Generally the term "tenancy by the entirety" refers only to ownership of real property.
See Fetter v. United States, 269 F.2d 467, 469 (6th Cir. 1959). The term "estates by the
entirety" is a broader term referring both to ownership of realty and personalty. See In re
Gallagher's Estate, 352 Pa. 476, 478, 43 A.2d 132, 133 (1945). This distinction, however, is
not always recognized and authorities commonly refer to tenancies by the entirety in per-
sonalty. See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6(c) (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter
cited as AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]. The 1978 Code speaks of property held as tenants by
the entirety, but neither the Code nor the legislative history suggests the term applies only
to real property and not to personal property as well.
3. Craig, An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety, 48 AM. BANK. L.J. 255 (1974).
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 1-72, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1970) (repealed 1978)(dealing
with bankruptcy proceedings generally). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 frequently will be re-
ferred to as either the Act or the 1898 Act.
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may be worse than the disease.
THE TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
At common law, four forms of concurrent ownership in realty
were possible: tenancy in common,5 joint tenancy, tenancy by the
entirety,7 and tenancy in coparcenary8 A tenancy by the entirety
results from the four unities found in a joint tenancy, time, title,
interest, and possession, plus the additional unity of marriage. 9
Husband and wife are considered to be one legal entity; each
spouse is deemed seised of the entire estate, not merely of an undi-
vided fractional interest, as with a joint tenancy. Four characteris-
tics are fundamental to tenancy by the entirety property: first, the
5. In a tenancy in common, two or more persons hold separate and distinct shares of an
undivided portion of the property. Each person is considered to take a separate and distinct
share as an individual rather than as a fictitious unity in a joint tenancy. Each tenant in
common may have a share that is greater or smaller than the shares of the others only if the
shares are fixed in the writing creating the cotenancy; otherwise all will be considered to
take in equal shares. No right of survivorship exists in a tenancy in common. See 2 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.5.
6. A joint tenancy exists when every joint tenant owns the undivided whole of the prop-
erty rather than a fractional interest; all tenants have equal rights to share in the enjoyment
of the property. The key characteristic of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship; on the
death of one of the joint tenants the survivors own the entire estate and nothing passes to
the heirs of the deceased tenant. See id. §§ 6.1-6.4; Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies:
Law, Fact and Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REV. 582 (1966).
7. Tenancy by the entirety is a form of joint tenancy in which the joint tenants are hus-
band and wife; each spouse owns the whole estate, not a fractional share thereof. 2 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.6. Virginia abolished the right of survivorship be-
tween joint tenants unless an intent to create right of survivorship expressly appears in the
instrument that establishes the tenancy. VA. CODE §§ 55-20, -21, (Repl. Vol. 1974). This
statute has been interpreted as abolishing tenancies by the entirety except when the deed or
will manifests an intent to create a tenancy by the entirety. Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739,
745, 149 S.E. 615, 618 (1930). The importance of this form of cotenancy is illustrated by the
results of an empirical study done in Iowa indicating that nine out of ten cotenancies in
land were joint tenancies between husband and wife. See Hines, supra note 6, at 623.
8. The estate by coparcenary, or as it is sometimes called, parcenary, arose under the
English law of primogeniture. On the death of an estate owner with no male heirs, the estate
descended to the female heirs who held the property by coparcenary, the female heirs being
regarded as one heir joined by unity of interest, time, title, and possession. See, e.g., Bolling
v. Teel, 76 Va. 487 (1882). The estate by coparcenary is obsolete under modern statues. See
C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAWS OF REAL PROPERTY 236 (1962).
9. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.6; Grilliot & Yocum,
Tenancy by the Entirety: An Ancient Fiction Frustrates Modern Creditors, 17 AM. Bus.
L.J. 341, 342 (1979); see also Murphy, Contenancies: A Critique for Creditors, 48 VA. L.
REV. 405 (1962); Phipps, Tenancy by the Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24 (1951).
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property is not subject to partition; second, neither spouse may
dispose of any part of the property without the consent of the
other; third, neither spouse may subject the property to the pay-
ment of his or her individual debts; finally, upon the death of ei-
ther spouse, the entire estate passes to the survivor.' 0
Tenancies by the entirety currently are recognized in some form
in twenty-six jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia and
the Virgin Islands;" however, the Bankruptcy Code significantly
affects only those seventeen jurisdictions in which the debtor's in-
terest in entirety property is exempt from process.' 2 Accordingly,
the analysis set out in this Article will be limited to jurisdictions
that are affected.
The estate by the entirety in personalty appears to exist in at
least sixteen jurisdictions. ' An analysis of the estate by the en-
10. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 6.6(b); Bienenfeld, Cred-
itors v. Tenancies by the Entirety, 1 WAYNE L. REV. 105 (1952); Murphy, supra note 9.
11. The following jurisdictions recognize tenants by the entirety property in some form:
Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Ma-
ryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Car-
olina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virgin
Islands, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Craig, supra note 3, at 295; Grilliot & Yocum, supra
note 9, at 354.
12. Jurisdictions that exempt entirety property from the claims of creditors of individual
debtors are as follows: Delaware, Citizens Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Astrin, 44 Del. 451, 455, 61 A.2d
419, 421 (1948); District of Columbia, In re Estate of Wall, 440 F.2d 215, 218 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Florida, First Nat'l Bank v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla. 1971); Indi-
ana, Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 444, 186 N.E. 769, 770 (1933); Maryland, Annapolis
Banking & Trust Co. v. Smith, 164 Md. 8, 9, 164 A. 157, 158 (1932); Michigan, Farrel v.
Paulus, 309 Mich. 441, 445, 15 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1944); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-
3 (1972) (entirety property possibly subject to creditors claims); Missouri, Cullum v. Rice,
236 Mo. App. 1113, 1118, 162 S.W.2d 342, 344 (1942); North Carolina, Edwards v. Arnold,
250 N.C. 500, 506, 109 S.E.2d 205, 209 (1959); Pennsylvania, Sterrett v. Sterrett, 401 Pa.
583, 585, 166 A.2d 1, 2 (1960); Rhode Island, Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 465, 25 A.2d
354, 360 (1942); Tennessee, United States v. Ragsdale, 206 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Tenn. 1962);
Vermont, Pettengill v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D. Vt. 1962); Virgin Islands,
Masonry Prod. Inc. v. Tees, 280 F. Supp. 654 (D.V.I. 1968); Virginia, Vasilon v. Vasilon, 192
Va. 735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951); Wyoming, Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 314 P.2d
944 (1957).
13. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8, 23 (1959). The following jurisdictions recognize the estate
by the entirety in personalty: Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Ver-
mont, Kentucky, Virginia, and Wyoming. See generally Grilliot & Yocum, supra note 9
(recommending the abolition of tenancies by the entirety and listing jurisdictions recogniz-
ing entirety property in personalty). See also Hines, Personal Property Joint Tenancies:
More Law, Fact and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1970); Townsend, Creation of Joint
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tirety in personalty, such as the proceeds from the sale of realty
held by the entirety, 14 rents and profits from realty held as tenants
by the entirety,15 and joint bank accounts,"' is beyond the scope of
this Article, except to note that the estate by the entirety in per-
sonalty appears to create the same problems in bankruptcy as the
tenancy by the entirety in realty.17
TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898
To appreciate the changes brought about by the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code an understanding of the treatment of entirety prop-
erty under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is necessary. Two funda-
mental concepts apply in bankruptcy proceedings. First, all the
bankrupt's nonexempt property should be brought within the ju-
risdiction of the bankruptcy court and liquidated in order to pay
the bankrupt's creditors as much as possible. Second, the bankrupt
is discharged from all of his individual debts, as well as his joint
and several obligations on joint debts, so that he may have a fresh
start.18 Generally, judicial interpretation fairly balances these prin-
ciples so that the bankrupt receives his fresh start without unduly
Rights Between Husband and Wife in Personal Property (pts. 1, 2), 52 MIcH. L. Rv. 779,
957 (1954). Estates by the entirety in personalty in a bankruptcy context are discussed in
Landers, Bankrupt's Spouse: The Forgotten Character in the Bankruptcy Drama, 1974
UTAH L. Rnv. 709.
14. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8, 39, 47, 62 (1959).
15. Moore v. Glotzbach, 188 F. Supp. 267, 270 (E.D. Va. 1960); Wylie v. Zimmer, 98 F.
Supp. 298, 300 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Bostian v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1951). See also
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 8, 57 (1959).
16. Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 971 (1972); Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1465 (1967). See also Kepner,
The Joint Survivorship Bank Account - A Concept Without A Name, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 596
(1953); Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Account Muddle, 26 U. CH. L. RFv. 376
(1959); Townsend, supra note 13, at 826-28.
17. See 4A COLLIER ON BANKRuprcY 70.18[7] (14th ed. 1978).
18. The Supreme Court in Lines v. Frederick stated the following:
The most important consideration limiting the breadth of the definition of
"property" lies in the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the debtor a
"new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt. The various provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act were adopted in the light of that view and are to be construed
when reasonably possible in harmony with it so as to effectuate the general
purpose and policy of the act."
400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970)(quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934)).
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prejudicing the rights of his creditors.
The courts' treatment of entirety property is a good example of
this balancing act. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that the
trustee in bankruptcy took title to "property, including any rights
of action, which prior to the filing of the petition [the bankrupt]
could by any means have transferred or which might have been
levied upon and sold under judicial process. '"19 State law deter-
mined which interests were transferable or leviable.2 0 In jurisdic-
tions that recognized an estate by the entirety was not subject to
process by individual creditors of a spouse or subject to convey-
ance by one spouse without the consent of the other, the estate by
the entirety did not pass to the trustee when only one spouse was
in bankruptcy. 1
If, however, both spouses were in bankruptcy, then their pro-
ceedings were consolidated for purposes of administering the ten-
ancy by the entirety property; thus, the trustee took the spouses'
aggregate interest in the entirety property into the joint estate.22
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970) (repealed 1978).
20. In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544, 546 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Wetteroff v.
Grand, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Hayes v. Schaefer, 399 F.2d 300, 301 (6th Cir. 1968) (bankrupt
was owner of entirety property with husband who died subsequent to filing of bankruptcy
petition but before proceedings were terminated; held under state law bankrupt not entitled
to one-half of the proceeds from sale of property); Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 353
(4th Cir. 1962) (reopening husband's bankruptcy estate to consolidate it with wife's later
filed estate in bankruptcy and making entireties property liable for joint obligations of both
bankrupts); see 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.1717] (14th ed. 1978).
21. Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1962); Blodgett v. United States, 161
F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1947) (criminal suit for concealing entirety property in bankruptcy);
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1931); In re Hallenbeck, 209 F. Supp. 263,
264 (W.D. Va. 1962) (husband, who owned realty with wife subject to deed of trust, filed
bankruptcy; held, equity in property was not an asset of bankruptcy estate). See generally
4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.17[7], [8] (14th ed. 1978); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1172, 1190
(1961). Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provides that property "in which the
bankrupt has at the date of bankrutcy an estate or interest by entirety which within six
months after bankruptcy becomes transferable in whole or in part solely by the bankrupt
shall, to the extent it becomes transferable vest in the trustee .... . 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1970) (repealed 1978). Thus, when a termination of the tenancy by the entirety occurs
within the six month period, the trustee takes title to the interest passing to the bankrupt.
22. In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544,'546 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wetteroff v.
Grand, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (dictum) (husband filed bankruptcy petition but wife did not);
Roberts v. Henry V. Dick & Co., 275 F.2d 943, 944 (4th Cir. 1960); In re Hallenbeck, 211 F.
Supp. 604, 605 (W.D. Va. 1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutal
Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Pennell, 15 F. Supp 743, 744 (W.D. Pa.
1935); In re Utz, 7 F. Supp. 612, 613 (D. Md. 1934); see 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 70.17
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In such a consolidated case, three estates were created: the hus-
band's, the wife's, and the joint estate. The trustee then would sell
the entirety property and the proceeds from the sale would be
placed into the joint estate to pay the joint creditors.23
Under the 1898 Act, the joint creditor was forced to act
promptly to avoid being prejudiced when an individual bankruptcy
involved entirety property not passing to the trustee. In order for
the joint creditor to reach entirety property, the joint creditor first
had to obtain a joint judgment against both the bankrupt and his
spouse. If one spouse successfully obtained a discharge in bank-
ruptcy, the joint creditor later could not obtain a joint judgment
because the discharge barred any such action. The joint creditor
therefore was limited to an individual judgment against the
nonbankrupt spouse, which could not be enforced against the en-
tirety property. 4 This result was considered inequitable because it
permitted a bankrupt to obtain a discharge of his debts and thus
barred the joint creditor from enforcing his claim against the en-
tirety property, which was not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court for the benefit of creditors.25
To circumvent this inequity, courts permitted joint creditors re-
lief from the automatic stay provisions and delayed the bankrupt's
discharge until a joint judgment and lien could be obtained.26 Phil-
lips v. Krakower 7 is the prototype of the decisions under the 1898
(14th ed. 1978).
23. Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1962), af'g sub noma. In re Reid, 198
F. Supp. 689, 691 (W.D. Va. 1961); Roberts v. Henry V. Dick & Co., 275 F.2d 943, 945 (4th
Cir. 1960); see 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 297 (1962).
This procedure has been followed in Virginia because the entirety would not be available
to satisfy the claims of the individual spouse's creditors. Some commentators have con-
cluded that if the bankruptcy trustee takes the entirety property and sells it, then the pro-
ceeds may be used for all unsecured creditors of both spouses individually, not just the joint
creditors. See Bienenfeld, supra note 10, at 114; Craig, supra note 3, at 271.
The question remains, however, whether the remainder should be distributed to individ-
ual creditors or to the bankrupts if the joint creditors are paid in full out of the joint estate.
See In re Roberts, 176 F. Supp. 361 (M.D.N.C. 1959), vacated sub nom. Roberts v. Henry V.
Dick & Co., 275 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1960) (dictum). Although there are no reported cases, the
practice in Virginia is to distribute the excess to the husband and wife.
24. Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 1962).
25. In re Magee, 415 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
26. Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931); Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190
U.S. 294 (1903).
27. 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931).
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Act involving the right of joint creditors to reach tenants by the
entirety property when one spouse had filed bankruptcy. In that
case, Phillips was adjudged a bankrupt on January 9, 1930. At the
time of his adjudication, he and his wife owned property as tenants
by the entirety. Mrs. Krakower held a note against them for $5,500
and, in order to reduce her claim to judgment, asked the bank-
ruptcy court to defer Phillips' discharge to enable her to secure a
judgment on the note against the bankrupt and his wife and sub-
ject the entirety property to its satisfaction. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in upholding the decision of the bankruptcy
court permitting Mrs. Krakower to proceed, stated as follows:
The discharge of Phillips in bankruptcy not only will prevent
judgment being obtained against him on the note, but will pre-
vent also, during his lifetime, the property held by entireties be-
ing subjected to the satisfaction of any judgment which may be
obtained against his wife. And so, although the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding has brought no interest in the estate by the entireties
into court for the benefit of the creditors of Phillips, his dis-
charge in bankruptcy will remove that entire property beyond
the reach of creditors entitled to subject it to their claims. The
question presented is whether, without giving these creditors an
opportunity to proceed, the court should grant the discharge
knowing that it will result in a legal fraud, i.e. the effectual with-
drawing of the property from the reach of those entitled to sub-
ject it to their claims, for the beneficial ownership and posses-
sion of those who created the claims against it. We cannot
conceive that any court would lend its aid to the accomplish-
ment of a result so shocking to the conscience.
The purpose of the bankruptcy act was to equitably distribute
the assets of distressed debtors among their creditors and to dis-
charge them from further liability after this had been done. It
was never contemplated that it should be used to perpetrate
fraud or to shield assets from creditors. 2
28. Id. at 765. This language was quoted with approval by the Fourth Circuit in In re
Seats, 537 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1976); Davison v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir.
1974); Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962). A case in the Eighth Circuit also
adopted this position. See In re Magee, 415 F. Supp. 521, 525 (W.D. Mo. 1976). Other courts
have preferred to let the bankruptcy court delay granting the bankrupt a discharge to en-
able a creditor to proceed under state law against property that cannot be reached in bank-
ruptcy, but is subject to creditor claims under state law. See Lockwood v. Exchange Bank,
1980] 707
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The joint creditor under the 1898 Act, on timely application to
the bankruptcy court, could have obtained relief from the stay to
reduce his claim to judgment against the bankrupt and the
nonbankrupt spouse in order to obtain a lien against the entirety
property. The relief granted by the bankruptcy court in Krakower
and its progeny, however, was not a license to the joint creditor to
obtain an in personam judgment against the bankrupt. The judg-
ment as to the bankrupt was in rem only, enforceable solely
against the interest in the entirety property; the bankrupt's in per-
sonam liability to the joint creditor was discharged by his
bankruptcy.2
The joint creditor's right to proceed against the bankrupt's en-
tirety property was not necessarily a right to pursue entirety prop-
erty acquired after discharge. Under the 1898 Act, Michigan was
the only state in which there appeared to be a basis for permitting
a joint creditor to reach entirety property acquired after dis-
charge.30 The legal fraud addressed by the court in Krakower was
the use of bankruptcy to shield from creditors assets that existed
as of the date of bankruptcy. Although a judgment may attach to
after-acquired property 1 in a bankruptcy context, to have allowed
190 U.S. 294, 301 (1903); Duff v. Tegeler, 19 F.2d 305, 308 (8th Cir. 1927); B.F. Roden
Grocery Co. v. Bacon, 133 F. 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1904); In re Wells, 105 F. 762, 766 (W.D.
Ark. 1900). Cf. In re Harold, 15 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 507, 516 (1977) (holding that because
common law protecting bankrupt wife's interest in tenancy by the entirety property is dis-
criminatory, trustee can reach her interest).
29. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 14f, 11 U.S.C. § 32(f) (1970) (repealed 1978).
30. See Schram v. Werback, 39 F. Supp. 616, 617 (E.D. Mich. 1941) (permitting a joint
creditor, after the husband and wife individually were discharged, to obtain a judgment
against the spouses jointly for a prebankruptcy debt and execute upon entirety property
acquired after bankruptcy). In view of Harris v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 631,
635 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972) which invalidated Michigan law per-
mitting joint creditors to proceed against entirety property after discharge, that Schram is
still good law is doubtful.
Other jurisdictions have held that joint creditors may not reach after-acquired entirety
property. See, e.g., Tipton v. Perpetual Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 143 Ind. App. 202, 205, 238
N.E.2d 695, 697 (1968); Philadelphia Dressed Beef Co. v. Rubin, 44 Pa. D.&C.2d 390 (1968)
(alternate holding).
31. VA. CODE § 8.01-458 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides the following:
Every judgment for money rendered in this Commonwealth by any state or
federal court or by confession of judgment, as provided by law, shall be a lien
on all the real estate of or to which the defendant in the judgment is or be-
comes possessed or entitled, from the time such judgment is recorded on the
judgment lien docket of the clerk's office of the county or city where such land
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a joint judgment obtained in a Krakower situation to attach to en-
tirety property acquired after discharge would have undermined
one of the primary purposes of bankruptcy law: to permit the
debtor a fresh start.32
A more difficult, and perhaps more typical, problem under the
1898 Act involved the joint creditor in the Krakower situtation
who reduced his claim to judgment after bankruptcy but before
discharge and then recorded the judgment to obtain a lien on the
entirety property existing as of the date of bankruptcy. Because
the equity"3 in the property was insufficient to satisfy the judg-
ment, such a joint creditor would have taken no action to satisfy
his lien out of the entirety property, in the hope that the value of
the debtor's equity in the property would increase with time. In
the case of In re Saunders, - however, the district court recognized
the right of the joint creditor to proceed to obtain a joint judgment
in accordance with Krakower, but limited the lien against the en-
tirety property to the equity in the property as of the date of
bankruptcy.
In Saunders, the United Virginia Bank was a holder of obliga-
tions under which the bankrupt, Fred Saunders, and his wife were
jointly liable. Saunders and his wife owned as tenants by the en-
tirety a parcel of real property that was subject to two liens. The
owner's equity in the property at the time of bankruptcy was ap-
proximately $521." The referee suspended discharge to allow the
bank to seek a state court judgment but concluded that the judg-
ment would have to be in rem and limited to the bankrupt's equity
of redemption at the date the petition was filed, $260, and not the
is situated ....
Id. (emphasis supplied). Other jurisdictions also extend the judgment lien to after-acquired
property. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 674(a) (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A
26-11 (West 1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-234 (Cum. Supp. 1979); TEx. Civ. CODE ANN. tit. 90,
§ 5449 (Vernon 1953).
32. The fresh start policy is intended to encourage the debtor's rehabilation after bank-
ruptcy by providing him with a chance to start over with certain property and free from
debt. Property exemptions and discharge are the two means in bankruptcy for implement-
ing this policy. See note 18 supra. See generally 1A COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 1 14.01[6]
(14th ed. 1978).
33. "Equity" in this context means the fair market value of the property in excess of the
prebankruptcy liens against it.
34. 365 F. Supp. 1351 (W.D. Va. 1973).
35. Id. at 1352.
1980] 709
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bankrupt's after-acquired equity in the property.3s6 The district
court found the referee's suspension of discharge and limitation
on the judgment to be correct but differed on the extent of the
limitation. The court held that the bank could proceed in per-
sonam against the entire equity interest in the property as of the
date of bankruptcy, $521, but it could not reach the after-acquired
interest in the entirety property.37
Consider the court in Saunders holding in the context of the fol-
lowing example, assuming for the purposes of illustration that the
1898 Act is applicable. Suppose on the date of bankruptcy, the fair
market value of the entirety property of the bankrupt and his
spouse is $80,000, and there is a valid first mortgage lien of
$70,000. A joint creditor with a claim of $50,000 is allowed to re-
duce his claim to judgment against the bankrupt and his spouse;
however, because a judicial sale of the property would not satisfy
the judgment lien, the joint creditor instead decides to postpone
enforcing his lien. Five years later, the property has appreciated in
value to $110,000 and the first mortage debt has been reduced by
$5,000, a net increase to the joint creditor of $45,000. The joint
creditor enforces his lien and sells the entirety property. According
to the court in Saunders, the joint creditor is limited to the equity
as of the date of bankruptcy, $10,000, not the equity at the time of
the sale, $45,000.
Suppose, in the same example, the joint creditor obtains a lien
and the first mortgagee then forecloses; from the proceeds of the
sale, the joint creditor receives $10,000. Following the foreclosure,
the bankrupt and his spouse acquire another home. Should the
joint creditor's judgment lien attach to the after-acquired property
to the extent of $40,000, the unpaid balance? The rule in Michi-
gan 8 notwithstanding, nothing would justify allowing the joint
creditor's lien to attach to entirety property acquired after dis-
charge because one of the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy,
discharge and a fresh start, would be thwarted.
A different question is whether the joint creditor should be able
36. Id. at 1353-54.
37. Id. at 1355. The court found the discharge to apply to any property or interest the
bankrupt obtained after the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. Id.
38. See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
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to enjoy the increased equity in the entirety property against
which he obtained a lien after bankruptcy but before a discharge.
In this situation, the entirety property is owned by the bankrupt
and his spouse on the date of bankruptcy. Because the home is
entirety property, it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court for the benefit of creditors. Therefore, creditors who,
but for the bankruptcy, would have a claim to the entirety prop-
erty should be permitted to proceed against it. The debtors then
would be forced to decide whether they both should file to bring
their entirety property within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court, or only one should file to keep it out. If they elect the latter,
then their entirety property would be subject to the claims of joint
creditors outside the bankruptcy court. The only distinction be-
tween the after-acquired equity and after-acquired property situa-
tion is that the lien on the entirety property in the after-acquired
equity situation is created before discharge, whereas the lien on
the after-acquired entirety property does not arise until after
discharge.
If the bankruptcy court stays the discharge to permit a lien to be
obtained on entirety property, that lien should not be limited to
the equity in the property at the time of bankruptcy because the
debtors have failed to exercise their right to liquidate the entirety
property in bankruptcy. Conversely, the discharge of the husband
should immunize entirety property acquired after the discharge
from prebankruptcy joint claims. Stated differently, entirety prop-
erty owned by debtors as of the date of bankruptcy should be
available to satisfy creditors' claims, subject to any homestead ex-
emption, either through the bankruptcy proceedings or state court
proceedings. Property acquired after bankruptcy should be im-
mune from prebankruptcy claims. After-acquired equity in preban-
kruptcy entirety property should be subject to joint creditors'
claims in state court proceedings if the debtors elect not to have
the entirety property submitted to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court.
If the entirety property is subject to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court but is abandoned by the trustee for lack of equity,39
39. Generally, the bankruptcy trustee may abandon any burdensome or worthless prop-
erty of the estate. See 4A COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 70.42 (14th ed. 1978). The Bankruptcy
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then creditors with liens against that property are not limited to
the value of the property as of the date of bankruptcy. Although a
discharge would prohibit a deficiency judgment, a lien creditor has
no obligation to foreclose.40 He may retain his lien in the hope that
the property will increase in value to the point when the entire
debt will be satisfied. The joint creditor, permitted to obtain a lien
on entirety property, should be treated no differently.
Thus, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the bankrupt and his
spouse assumed the risk that if they decided not to subject their
entirety property to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, then
a joint creditor would have been allowed to obtain a lien on the
entirety property before discharge and the lien would have been
valid against the prebankruptcy entirety property until satisfied or
extinguished by sale.
TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code contains some fundamental changes
with respect to property subject to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court, including the treatment of tenants by the entirety
property. The issues raised by the 1978 Code when the debtor
41
owns property as tenants by the entirety may best be understood
with reference to the following sections of the Code:
(1) The interest of the trustee in entirety property under sec-
tion 541;'2
(2) the right of the trustee to partition or sell the entirety
Act of 1898 recognized the right to abandon executory contracts, § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b)
(1970) (repealed 1978); rights in pending applications for patents, copyrights and trade-
marks, § 70a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (2) (1970) (repealed 1978); and property against which
taxes are assessed, § 64(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(4) (1970) (repealed 1978). Assets that contribute
nothing toward satisfaction of the claims of general creditors, such as property subject to a
valid lien, frequently were abandoned. To ensure validity of an abandoment, the trustee
could obtain a court order approving the abandonment of any property. R. BANKR. P. 608.
Compare § 554 of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which gives the trustee the right to aban-
don property of the estate that is burdensome or of inconsequential value. 11 U.S.C.A. §
554(a) (West Supp. 1979).
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Hall, 177 Va. 658, 666, 15 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1941).
41. The term "bankrupt" is not used in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Section
101(2) defines "debtor" as a "person or municipality concernipg which a case under this title
has been commenced." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12) (West Supp. 1979).
42. Id. § 541.
[Vol. 21:701
TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY
property under section 363;'Sand
(3) the right of the debtor to exempt the entirety property
under section 522.""
The Interest of the Trustee in Entirety Property Under Section
541
Section 541(a)(1) of the 1978 Code provides that the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case.' 45 This simple but comprehensive state-
ment differs substantially from the approach taken in the 1898
Act, which specifically enumerated the kinds of property that were
to be included in the bankrupt's distributable estate.'6 Section 541
establishes that the bankruptcy estate is comprised of the debtor's
property at the- time of the "commencement of the case." This is
similar to section 70a of the 1898 Act, which provided that the
trustee is vested with title to the bankrupt's property as of the
date of the filing of the petition.
The primary difference between the acts is that the broad lan-
guage of section 541 includes exempt property in the estate, 8
whereas section 70a of the 1898 Act specifically excluded exempt
property.49 In Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, the Supreme Court
recognized the exclusion of exempt property from the bankruptcy
estate.50 Section 541(a)(1) effectively overrules Lockwood because
43. Id. § 363.
44. Id. § 522.
45. Id. § 541(a)(1). Section 541 specifies what property becomes property of the estate.
The legislative history of this section can be found in S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
82-84, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5868.
46. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970) (repealed 1978).
47. Id.
48. See H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 368, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6324. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970), which holds that
vacation pay, accured prior to the date of the filing of bankruptcy and collected afterwards,
does not pass to the trustee, in effect has been overruled.
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970) (repealed 1978) stated that
"The trustee of estate. . . shall in turn be vested with the title of the bankrupt as of the
date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is
to propterty which is held to be exempt. ... " Id.
50. 190 U.S. 294 (1903). Lockwood held that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to
protect or enforce the right of a creditor to whom the bankrupt had waived his exemption.
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it includes all property in which the debtor has an interest in the
estate, even that necessary for a fresh start.5 1 Although section 541
makes no reference to the estate by the entirety as it does to com-
munity property,52 the legislative history makes clear that an es-
tate by the entirety is property of the estate under section 541 re-
gardless of whether only one spouse is in bankrupty.
5 s
The Right of the Trustee to Partition or Sell the Entirety Prop-
erty Under Section 363
To overcome the problem that tenants by the entirety property
is not severable or subject to devise by one spouse alone, the 1978
Code provides in section 363(h)54 that, subject to certain condi-
Id. at 301. Such creditor was free to proceed against the exempt property in state court.
51. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 48, at 367-68, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note
48, at 6324. After the property comes into the estate under the 1978 Act, the debtor is
permitted to exempt it under § 522. See note 78-112 infra.
52. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979) states as follows:
All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as
of the commencement of the case that is-
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the debtor;
or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowa-
ble claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's
spouse, to the extent that such interest is so liable.
Id.
53. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 48, at 177, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 48, at
6137-38 states the following:
The bill [HR 8200] also changes the rules with respect to marital interests in
property. Interests in the nature of dower and curtesy will not prevent the
property involved from becoming property of the estate, nor will it prevent sale
of the property by the trustee. With respect to other co-ownership interests,
such as tenancies by the entirety, joint tenancies, and tenancies in common,
the bill does not invalidate the rights, but provides a method by which the
estate may realize on the value of the debtor's interest in the property while
protecting the other rights. The trustee is permitted to realize on the value of
the property by being permitted to sell it without obtaining the consent or a
waiver of rights by the spouse of the debtor or the co-owner, as may be re-
quired for a complete sale under applicable State law. The other interest is
protected under H.R. 8200 by giving the spouse a right of first refusal at a sale
of the property, and by requiring the trustee to pay over to the spouse the
value of the spouse's interest in the property if the trustee sells the property to
someone other than the spouse. Similar rules will govern certain sales of com-
munity property if both spouses are not preceeding under title 11.
Id.(footnotes omitted).
54. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(h) (West Supp. 1979) provides the following:
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tions, the trustee in bankruptcy may sell tenants by the entirety
property that has not otherwise been exempted under section
522(b).5 The right of the trustee to sell entirety property clearly
suggests that Congress intended entirety property to be included
in the estate, even though it is not specifically mentioned in sec-
tion 541. This is a major change with respect to entirety property
and has important consequences, not only for the nonbankrupt
spouse, but for creditors of the debtor and for joint creditors of the
debtor and nonbankrupt spouse.
Four conditions must be met before the trustee may sell the en-
tirety property. First, a partition of the property among the estate
and the nonbankrupt spouse must be impractical.5 6 Obviously, if
the entirety property is a residence, as -in the typical case, then
partition would be impractical. The entirely property may be un-
improved land, however, which could be partitioned. Second, the
trustee must demonstrate that a sale of the estate's undivided in-
terest would realize significafitly less for the estate than a sale of
the entire property.57 Presumably, this would not be a difficult
task; in the typical situation, the undivided interest of the non-
bankrupt spouse will be valued at significantlr less than the es-
tate's interest if the entirety property is sold as a whole unit.
Third, the trustee must demonstrate that the benefit to the estate
Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell both the
estate's interest, under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the interest of
any co-owner in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the
commencement of the case, an undivided interest as a tenant in common, joint
tenant, or tenant by the entirety, only if-
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners
is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize
significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests
of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests
of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribu-
tion, for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or
power.
Id.
55. Id. § 522(b); see note 79 infra.
56. Id. § 363(h)(1).
57. Id. § 363(h)(2).
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outweighs the detriment to the nonbankrupt spouse."5 Finally, if
the property is used in the production, transmission, or distribu-
tion for sale of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for
heat, light, or power, then the trustee may not sell either the
debtor's interest or the whole.59
Court approval is not always necessary for a sale under section
363(h), though section 363(b)60 requires that such a sale take place
only "after notice and a hearing." 1 A hearing is required, however,
only when a party in interest requests one. 2 Thus, the nonbank-
rupt spouse .must request a hearing; otherwise, the sale may be
consummated without court approval. If a hearing is requested,
section 363(e)63 provides that the court may prohibit or condition
the sale as is necessary to provide the nonbankrupt spouse with
adequate protection.
The concept of adequate protection is set forth in section 361 of
the 1978 Code." Section 361 recognizes three means by which the
58. Id. § 363(h)(3).
59. Id. § 363(h)(4). This limitation is intended to protect public utilities from losing
power sources if a joint oWner goes into bankruptcy. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 45, at
56, 60, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 45, at 5842-43.
60. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b) (West Supp. 1979) provides that "[t]he trustee, after notice and
hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the
estate." Id.
61. Id. § 102(1) states as follows:
"after notice and a hearing," or a similar phrase-
(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circum-
stances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular
circumstances; but
(B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if such notice is given prop-
erly and if-
(i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a party in interest; or
(ii) there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before
such act must be done, and the court authorizes such act.
Id.
62. Id. § 102(1)(B)(i).
63. Id. § 363(e) provides the following:
notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request
of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed
to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court shall prohibit or condition
such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such
interest. In any hearing under this section, the trustee has the burden of proof
on the issue of adequate protection.
64. Id. § 361 states as follows:
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interests of a coowner can be protected adequately: requiring the
trustee to make periodic cash payments to the coowner to the ex-
tent of any decrease in value of the coowner's interest in the prop-
erty;65 providing the coowner with an additional or replacement
lien on other property to the extent of any decrease in the coown-
er's interest in the property;" granting other forms of adequate
protection the court feels would provide the coowner with the "in-
dubitable equivalent" of its interest in the property.67 The meth-
ods of adequate protection outlined in section 361, however, are
not exclusive and do not appear applicable to the protection of the
nonbankrupt spouse.6 8 Indeed, the House report 9 indicates that
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this
title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be
provide by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to such entity, to
the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale or lease under
section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title
results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent
that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value of
such entity's interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensa-
tion allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative ex-
pense, as will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable
equivalent of such entity's interest in such property.
Id. The Code does not define the term "adequate protection"; rather, it specifies the means
by which adequate protection may be provided. See also note 68 infra.
65. Id. § 361(1).
66. Id. § 361(2).
67. Id. § 361(3). A compromise between the House and the Senate over the question of
adequate protection resulted in the deletion from the final version of § 361 of a provision
which would have permitted adequately protecting a secured party by giving the party an
administrative expense priority to the extent of any loss. The administrative priority protec-
tion, however, was considered too uncertain to be meaningful. See S. REP. No. 989, supra
note 45, at 54, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 45, at 5840. Therefore, § 361(3) specifi-
cally excludes the court from granting an entity compensation in the form of an administra-
tive expense as a means of providing adequate protection.
68. The concept of adequate protection in § 361 clearly is intended to protect a creditor
with a lien on the entirety property whose interest might be affected by the sale. This would
be particularly applicable if the trustee proposed to partition the entirety property. Query
whether an unsecured joint creditor could request adequate protection under § 361 on the
theory that he has a priority claim under state law to the entirety property and proceeds
therefrom ahead of individual creditors of the debtor. Such a request is inconsistent with §
363(j), which regulates the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the entirety prop-
erty, and should be denied.
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the only protection intended is that provided in section 363(i),70
which gives the nonbankrupt spouse the right of first refusal to
purchase the entirety property, and section 363(j), 1 which requires
the trustee to pay over to the nonbankrupt spouse the value of the
spouse's interest in the property if the trustee sells to someone
other than the spouse. Assuming the trustee conducts the sale in a
commercially reasonable manner, 2 the nonbankrupt spouse cannot
argue that his or her interest in the property is decreased because
of the sale. Creative lawyers, however, will develop evidence of loss;
whether the adequate protection concept in section 361 would ap-
ply to protect the nonbankrupt spouse when entirety property is
sold by the trustee is unclear.
Section 363(e) expressly places the burden of proof on the trus-
tee regarding the issue of adequate protection.7 3 If the nonban-
krupt spouse requests a hearing on the sale of the entirety prop-
erty, 4 however, the Code is unclear as to whether the trustee has
the burden of proving the four conditions set forth in section
69. See H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 48, at 176-77, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note
48, at 6136-38.
70. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(i) (West Supp. 1979) provides that
[blefore the consummation of a sale of property to which subsection (g) or
(h) of this section applies, or of property of the estate that was community
property of the debtor and the debtor's spouse immediately before the com-
mencement of the case, the debtor's spouse, or a co-owner of such property, as
the case may be, may purchase such property at the price at which such sale is
to be consummated.
Id.
71. Id. § 3630) states the following:
After a sale of property to which subsection (g) or (h) of this section applies,
the trustee shall distribute to the debtor's spouse or the co-owners of such
property, as the case may be, and to the estate, the proceeds of such sale, less
the costs and expenses, not including any compensation of the trustee, of such
sale, according to the interests of such spouse or co-owners, and of the estate.
Id.
72. Although there is no generally accepted definition of "commercially reasonable" in a"
bankruptcy context, an analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code may be appropriate. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 9-507(2) ("A disposition which has been approved in any judicial proceeding
or by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of creditors shall conclusively be
deemed to be commercially reasonable . . . ").
73. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e) (West Supp. 1979).
74. Id. § 362(b) requires a hearing, if requested by the nonbankrupt spouse, as a prerequi-
site to sale of the entirety property. See notes 66-72 supra.
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363(h). 5 Clearly, the inclusion of the four conditions indicates that
Congress recognized in section 363(h) that a coowner's interest
could be affected adversely by the trustee's sale. Viewing these
conditions as minimal safeguards to the coowner and thus a form
of adequate protection, the trustee should have the burden of
proving their existence.
Once the sale of the entirety property has been consummated,
section 3630) 716 provides that the trustee shall distribute the pro-
ceeds, less costs and administrative expenses, to the debtor's
spouse and the estate according to their respective interests in the
property. The 1978 Code, however, provides no guidance as to how
the interests in the entirety property are to be computed. Presum-
ably, the bankruptcy court may consider the source of the funds
used to acquire the entirety property in order to determine the in-
dividual spouses' share or, more likely, could apply the state pre-
sumption that operates in nondeath terminations of the joint inter-
est. For example, in Virginia, property owned as tenancy by the
entirety automatically converts to a tenancy in common upon di-
vorce, giving each spouse an equal one-half interest with no right
of survivorship.77
The Right of the Debtor to Exempt the Estate by the Entirety
Under Section 522
As previously stated, 8 section 541 puts all property in which the
debtor has an interest, including exempt property, into the estate
and then permits the debtor to elect his exemptions under section
522.71 Section 70 of the 1898 Act specifically. excluded exempt
75. See note 54 supra.
76. 11 U.S.C.A. 363(j) (West Supp. 1979); see note 64 supra.
77. E.g., VA. CODE § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
78. See notes 45-51 supra & accompanying text.
79. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West Supp. 1979) states as follows:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless
the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this
subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsec-
tion (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of
the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been
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property from the bankrupt estate;80 therefore, before one could
determine whether property was property of the estate, one first
had to determine whether it was exempt under the law of the state
of the bankrupt's domicile. 81
Sensing a need for change, one commentator8 2 suggested that
section 70a of the 1898 Act be replaced with a single provision giv-
ing the trustee title to all of the debtor's property as of the date of
bankruptcy. 3 As a matter of federal bankruptcy policy, however,
certain amounts or types of property had to be preserved to aid
the debtor's rehabilitation. Hence, section 522 which sets out the
bankruptcy exemption provisions was adopted. Subparagraph (d)
incorporates a federal exemption law, although the debtor has the
option8 4 of retaining his state exemptions unless the law of the
state of the debtor's domicile specifically provides that he may not
elect the federal bankruptcy exemption. 5
If the debtor does not elect the federal bankruptcy exemptions
or the exemptions are not available pursuant to state law, then
located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place;
and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before
the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint
tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint
tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Id.
80. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970) (repealed 1978); see note 49
supra.
81. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1978); Holden v. Strat-
ton, 198 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1905). See generally 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 6.08, 6.13
(14th ed. 1978); 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 7.08, 70.15[2] (14th ed. 1978).
82. See Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 1), 47 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 407, 473-74 (1972).
83. Note that 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West Supp. 1979) does not vest in the trustee title to the
debtor's property. Rather, an estate is created.
84. The debtor must take affirmative action to excerise his option and claim his exemp-
tion. The affirmative step need not be taken before filing for bankruptcy and presumably
the procedure will be clarified by bankruptcy rules when they are promulgated.
85. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Virginia has adopted a law making the
federal bankruptcy exemption under id. § 522(d) unavailable to its citizens. VA. CODE § 34-
3.1 (Supp. 1979). Several other jurisdictions have enacted legislation denying their citizens
the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme. 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 79-363 (to be codi-
fied as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.20); 1979 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act No. 596 (West) (to be codi-
fied as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3881); 1979 Ohio Legis. Bull. 360, 364 (to be codified as OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662).
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under section 522(b)(2) he may exempt any property that would be
exempt under federal nonbankruptcy law,86 and state or local law
of the debtor's domicile. In addition, the debtor may exempt any
interest in tenants by the entirety or joint tenant property to the
extent that such interest is exempt from process under applicable
nonbankruptcy law. Thus, if the debtor resides in a state in which
tenants by the entirety property is recognized and his interest in
such property is immune from process by his creditors, then the
debtor may exempt such property. If the debtor exempts the en-
tirety property, section 522(c) protects the exempt property from
creditors' claims by providing that property exempted is not liable
for any debt of the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case.87
This result produces the potential for a serious inequity in the
1978 Code that can be illustrated best by the following example.
The husband files for relief under Chapter 7 of the new Code. At
86. Among federal nonbankruptcy exemptions are the following: Civil Service Retirement
Benefits, 5 U.S.C.A. § 8346 (West Supp. 1979); Foreign Service retirement and disability
payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1970), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11, 952, 42 Fed. Reg.
2293, 4809 (1977); Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act death and disa-
bility benefits, 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1970); special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional
Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C. 562(c) (1970); Veteran's benefits, 38 U.S.C.A. § 3101(a) (West
1979); Social Security payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1970); injury or death compensation pay-
ments from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1970); Railroad Retirement Act annuities
and pensions, 45 U.S.C.A. § 231(m) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Railroad Unemployment In-
surance benefits, 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1970); wages of fishermen working on fishing vessels,
masters, and seamen and apprentices, 46 U.S.C.A. § 601 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
87. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c) provides that
[u]nless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not
liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose, or that is
determined under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen, before
the commencement of the case, except-
(1) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1) or section 523(a)(5) of
this title;
(2) a lien that is-
(A) not avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this
title;
(B) not voided under section 506(d) of this title; or
(C)(i) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed; and
(ii) avoided under section 545(2) of this title.
Id. The House report states that § 522(c) "insulates exempt property from prepetition
claims" except tax claims, alimony, maintenance, or child support claims that are not ex-
cepted from discharge and debts secured by valid nonvoidable liens. H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 48, at 361, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 48, at 6317.
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the time of filing, husband and wife own a home as tenants by the
entirety that has a fair market value of $100,000. There is a first
mortgage lien against the property with a balance due of $60,000.
The wife does not file bankruptcy. The $100,000 home becomes
property of the estate under section 541(a)(1). The Husband, in
order to preserve his "fresh start" after bankruptcy, has a choice;
he either may elect the federal exemptions under section 522(b)(1)
or the state and federal nonbankruptcy exemptions under section
522(b)(2). Under the federal exemption, only $7,500 of the $40,000
equity may be exempted."' On the other hand, if the state exemp-
tions are selected, the home would be completely exempt under
section 522(b)(2)(B), assuming that under applicable state law the
interest of the husband in the entirety property is exempt from
process. Thus, unless the debtor concludes that the remaining fed-
eral bankruptcy exemptions under section 522(d) are more attrac-
tive than the state exemptions, he will elect the state exemptions
to protect his equity in the property.
Creditors of the husband are not prejudiced by his decision to
exempt the tenants by the entirety property because, under state
law, the property is immune from their process. anyway.89 Had the
husband chosen the federal exemption, thus including the tenants
by the entirety property in the bankrupt estate subject to the
$7,500 federal exemption, the inclusion of $12,500 in the es-
tate-the husband's one-half interest in the $40,000 equity, less
the $7,500 federal exemption-would be a windfall to the hus-
band's creditors and prejudicial to the joint creditors of the hus-
band and wife to the extent the joint creditors must share pro rata
with the husband's individual creditors.
Suppose in the above example a bank holds an unsecured de-
mand note of $10,000 executed by husband and wife. It is a joint
88. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979) provides that the following property may
be exempted:
The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real property
or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor.
Id.
89. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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and several obligation. Under the 1898 Act, the bank would be en-
titled to relief from the stay to reduce its claim to judgment
against both husband and wife, in order to obtain a lien against the
home.90 The bank also would be entitled to file a proof of claim in
the husband's bankruptcy to share as a creditor in his individual
estate.
Whether the bank will be entitled to similar relief under the
1978 Code when the tenants by the entirety property is exempted
and thus not subject to liquidation for the benefit of creditors is
uncertain. If not, the prejudice to the bank is obvious. The $40,000
equity in the home is more than enough to satisfy the bank's
$10,000 claim. If the husband exempts the home under section
522(b)(2), however, section 522(c) provides that property exempted
under section 522 is not liable during or after the case for any debt
of the bankrupt arising before the commencement of the case. The
bank's note is a prebankruptcy debt; the home that has been ex-
empted is not liable to satisfy the debt and the bank's request for
relief from the stay to sue the husband and wife to obtain a lien on
the home thus would be denied on the basis of section 522(c). Un-
less the wife survives the husband, the bank's judgment against the
wife cannot be satisfied out of the entirety property."1 Although
this result seems inevitable from a reading of section 522(c), it is
irreconcilable with judicial treatment of tenants by the entirety
property under the 1898 Act 92 and inconsistent with the 1978
Code 9 3 and the accompanying congressional comments.9
90. Phillips v. Kakrower, 46 F.2d 764, 766 (4th Cir. 1931); see notes 26-29 supra & accom-
panying text.
91. Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 1962).
92.See, e.g., Davison v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1220, 1222 (4th Cir. 1974); In re
Bishop, 482 F.2d 381, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1973); In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544, 546-47 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wetteroff v. Grand, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Reid v. Richardson,
304 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1962); Fetter v. United States, 269 F.2d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 1959);
Phillips v. Kakrower, 46 F.2d 764, 765-66 (4th Cir. 1931); United States v. Hart, 382 F.
Supp. 244, 246 (D.D.C. 1974); In re Baker, 299 F. Supp. 404, 406 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
93. In 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(h) (West Supp. 1979), Congress recognized that the debtor's
interest in entirety property should be available to creditors. Thus, it is inconsistent to in-
terpret § 522(c) to immunize totally entirety property from creditors when it is unavailable
in the bankruptcy proceeding.
94. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 48, at 175-77, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 48, at
6136. The legislative history indicates Congress was concerned with providing a method for
the estate to realize on the debtor's interest in tenancy by the entirety property. The trustee
1980]
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Assume in our example that the husband chooses the federal ex-
emptions because he owns several unmatured life insurance con-
tracts,9 5 plus an award under a crime victim's reparation law9" the
aggregate value of which exceeds his equity in his home. The
home, then, is subject to the trustee's right to sell.97 Furthermore,
assume that the trustee sells the home and, after paying off the
first mortgage, holds $40,000. The $40,000 would be distributed as
follows: $7,500 to the husband on account of his federal exemption;
$20,000 to the wife, assuming her interest is one-half; and, the bal-
ance, $12,500 to the husband's creditors. The bank is still
prejudiced, because under state law the individual creditors of the
husband cannot share in the proceeds from the sale of the entirety
property; 8 and under the 1978 Code the individual creditors share
on a pro rata basis with the joint creditors.9 9 The bank, however,
can execute on the wife's interest, even though the husband's
$7,500 fresh start is immune from attack.10 The example demon-
strates that the joint creditor's right to share in proceeds from the
sale of tenants by the entirety property depends solely upon
whether the debtor elects the federal bankruptcy exemptions or
the state exemptions.
The historical purpose of exemption laws has been to protect the
debtor from his creditors, to "permit him to start afresh free from
the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business mis-
fortune,"''1 1 and to give him a "new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of pre-existing debt."'1 2 Under the 1898 Act, exempt prop-
is empowered to sell the property without either the consent of the nonbankrupt spouse or a
waiver of the spouse's rights regardless of the requirements of state law. Id.; see note 53
supra.
95. Unmatured life insurance contracts owned by the debtor are exempt under 11
U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(7) (West Supp. 1979).
96. An award to the debtor under a crime victim's reparation law is exempted under id. §
522(d)(11)(A).
97. Id. § 363(h); see note 54 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
99. Under the 1978 Code, if the debtor elects the federal exemptions and his interest in
the entirety property is sold the individual creditors are entitled to share on a pro rata basis
with the joint creditors in the proceeds from the sale of the tenants by the entirety property.
100. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c) (West Supp. 1979).
101. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
102. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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erty was determined by state law. In providing for federal exemp-
tions in the new Code, Congress expressed a feeling that the state
exemptions are "outmoded, designed for more rural times, and
hopelessly inadequate to serve the needs of and provide a fresh
start for modern urban debtors."103
The second purpose of the bankruptcy law, to pay the bank-
rupt's creditors as much as possible out of the nonexempt assets of
the estate, has not been abandoned with the adoption of the Code.
Congress noted with respect to tenants by the entirety property
and other coownership interests that creditors would be able to re-
alize on the value of the debtor's interest in coowned property by
making it part of the estate.10 4 Thus, Congress apparently con-
cluded that tenants by the entirety property over and above the
$7,500 federal exemption is not necessary for a fresh start. Con-
gress, however, felt that because of geographical differences, the
federal exemption might not always be best; in such cases, the
debtor has the option of electing his state exemptions, plus any
applicable nonbankruptcy federal exemptions.1°5 The decision to
grant each state the power to deny its citizens the right to elect the
federal exemption scheme was a congressional compromise.10 6
103. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 48, at 126, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 48, at
6087 states as follows:
Though exemption laws have been considered within the province of state
law under the current Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 8200 adopts the position that
there is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy
comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start. Recognizing, how-
ever, the circumstances do vary in different parts of the county, the bill per-
mits the States to set exemption levels appropriate to the locale, and allows
debtors to choose between the State exemptions and the Federal exemptions
provided in the bill. Thus, the bill continues to recognize the States' interest in
regulating credit within the States, but enunciates a bankruptcy policy favor-
ing a fresh start.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
104. Id. at 177, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 48, at 6137-38.
105. Id. at 126, reprinted in AD. NEws, supra note 48, at 6087.
106. Senator DeConcini stated:
Section 522 of the House amendment represents a compromise on the issue of
exemption between the position taken in the House bill, and that taken in the
Senate amendment. . . .The States may, by passing a law, determine whether
the Federal exemptions will apply as an alternative to State exemptions in
bankruptcy cases.
124 CONG. REc. S17,412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The final result under the 1978 Code is an imbalance between
the differing exemption schemes. If the federal exemptions are
elected, then the debtor's interest in tenants by the entirety prop-
erty, except for the $7,500 federal exemption, is available to satisfy
the claims of his creditors. When the state exemptions are chosen
or the federal exemptions are unavailable, tenants by the entirety
property is immune from the claims of creditors.
The inequity is magnified by the fact that the $7,500 federal ex-
emption is limited to real property used as a residence whereas no
such limitation exists on the tenants by the entirety exemption in
section 522(b)(2)(B). Thus, a debtor and his spouse might own as
tenants by the entirety their residence and other real property all
of which would be exempt under section 522(b)(2)(B).
This inequity favoring the state exemption election over the fed-
eral scheme suggests that Congress intended section 522(c) to ap-
ply to the federal exemptions set forth in section 522(d) and to the
federal nonbankruptcy and state exemptions referred to in section
522(b)(2)(A), but not to entirety property. Thus, when the hus-
band in our example elects his federal nonbankruptcy and state
exemptions, the bankruptcy court should permit the bank to re-
duce its note to judgment so as to obtain a lien on the tenants by
the entirety property. The fresh start is not jeopardized. Assuming
that under state law the debtor has a $5,000 homestead exemption
in real property, the bank's judgment lien against the house would
be inferior to the husband's $5,000 homestead exemption because
the state homestead exemption is not liable for the bank's judg-
ment under section 522(c). The debtor's fresh start as defined by
state law would be safeguarded.10 7
This result does not prejudice the nonbankrupt spouse because
her interest in the house and liability to the bank is not altered by
107. Even if the bank's note contains language waiving the homestead exemption, the
waiver would be unenforceable. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(e) (West Supp. 1979) states:
A waiver of exemptions executed in favor of a creditor that holds an un-
secured claim against the debtor is unenforceable in a case under this title with
respect to such claim against property that the debtor may exempt under sub-
section (b) of this section. A waiver by the debtor of a power under subsection
(f) or (h) of this section to avoid a transfer, under subsection (g) or (i) of this
section to exempt property, or under subsection (i) if this section to recover
property or to preserve a transfer, is unenforceable in a case under this title.
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the bankruptcy. In fact, if the house is available to satisfy the
bank's claim, the nonbankrupt spouse will be benefited to the ex-
tend that her separate estate may not be called upon to satisfy the
debt owed the bank.108
If the husband and wife file a joint case under section 302(a)10 9
and elect their state exemptions, and the bankruptcy court consoli-
dates the estate under section 302(b), 10 then section 522(b)(2)(B),
which removes entirety property from the estate, apparently would
be inapplicable; however, if the estates are not consolidated, then
the tenants by the entirety property could be exempted from the
estate under section 522(b)(2)(B). 11' The House report states as
follows:
Subsection (b) [of section 302] requires the court to determine
the extent, if any, to which the estates of the two debtors will be
consolidated; that is, assets and liabilities combined in a single
pool to pay creditors. Factors that will be relevant in the court's
determination include the extent of jointly held property and
the amount of jointly-owned debts. The section, of course, is not
108. If the bank's only recourse is to sue the wife and she pays the bank out of her sepa-
rate estate, she cannot sue the husband for contribution because the husband's contingent
liability to her was discharged by his bankruptcy. See id. § 727. She could file a proof of
claim and share in the distribution. See id. §§ 502, 509.
109. Id. § 302(a) states:
A joint case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a single petition under such chapter by an individual that
may be a debtor under such chapter and such individual's spouse. The com-
mencement of a joint case under a chapter of this title constitutes an order for
relief under such chapter.
Id.
110. Id. § 302(b) provides as follows: "[A]fter the commencement of a joint case, the court
shall determine the extent, if any, to which the debtor's estates shall be consolidated." Id.
111. Under id. § 522(m), the wife could elect the federal exemption and the husband the
state exemption. If this occurs, the trustee in the wife's case or in a consolidated case possi-
bly could sell the entirety property under id. § 363(h). If the trustee is permitted to sell the
entirety property and thereby ignore that the tenant by the entirety property is exempt in
the husband's case, then the equity in the property less the wife's $7,500 exemption and the
husband's state exemption would be available for distribution to creditors. This is consis-
tent with the notion that § 522(c) is not intended to immunize entirety property, only the
federal bankruptcy or state exemption. On the other hand, if the husband takes the state
exemption, his interest in the entirety property arguably immune. The creditors would get
paid only out of the wife's interest less her $7,500 federal exemption. Thus, the husband
could remove his entire interest in the entirety property from his creditors, not just his
exempt portion.
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license to consolidate in order to avoid other provisions of the
title to the detriment of either the debtors or their creditors. It
is designed mainly for ease of administration.11 2
The question is whether Congress intended to completely insu-
late tenants by the entirety property from the claims of creditors.
The creditors' answer is obviously no, because the clear purpose of
section 363(h) is to make available to creditors the debtor's inter-
est in tenants by the entriety property that was unavailable to
creditors under the 1898 Act. The contrary argument is that Con-
gress felt that the state exemption laws were so inadequate and
antiquated for fresh start purposes that they consciously decided
that the debtor electing his state exemption should have his en-
tirety property free from the claims of both joint creditors and in-
dividual creditors. Under the prior law, individual creditors had no
right to satisfaction out of property held as tenants by the entirety.
Whether Congress intended section 522(c) to immunize entirety
property from the claims of joint creditors will have to be decided
by the courts.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests that Congress was unaware of
the inequity it created with respect to entirety property when it
adopted section 522(c). For the Supreme Court's two-fold purpose
of distributing the maximum amount of nonexempt property to
the creditors while preserving the debtor's fresh start to have con-
tinuing validity, section 522(c) should not be interpreted to immu-
nize tenants by the entirety property from the claims of joint cred-
itors. Rather, section 522(c) should be construed as inapplicable to
tenants by the entirety property not subject to the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court under section 522(b)(2)(B). Section 522(c)
was intended only to protect property exempt under the federal
bankruptcy exemptions enumerated in section 522(d) or exempt
under state law or federal nonbankruptcy law. Because tenants by
the entirety property is not exempt under state law from claims of
joint creditors except to the extent of the homestead exemption,
112 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 48, at 321, reprinted in AD. NEWS, supra note 48, at
3617.
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section 522(c) would not bar a joint creditor from obtaining a judg-
ment lien against it.
A debtor should not be able to free completely his entirety prop-
erty from the claims of joint creditors merely by electing the state
exemption. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code was not intended to shield
assets from creditors except to the extent those assets are neces-
sary for a fresh start. If the debtor elects the state exemption for a
fresh start, then the entirety property should be immune from
joint creditors only to the extent that it is immune under state
exemption laws.
Therefore, if the state exemption is chosen, a joint creditor of
the debtor and the nonbankrupt spouse whose debt arose before
the commencement of the case should be permitted to reduce the
joint claim to judgment before discharge in order to obtain a lien
against the tenants by the entirety property owned by the debtor
on the date of bankruptcy. After-acquired equity in entirety prop-
erty owned on the date of bankruptcy would be subject to the joint
creditor's lien, but entirety property acquired after bankruptcy
would be free of any prebankruptcy claim of the joint creditor.
1980]
